The increasing use of internetworking protocols to connect administratively heterogeneous networks has raised the question of how an organization can control the ow of information across its network boundaries. One method for doing so is the use of visas, a cryptographic technique for authenticating and authorizing a ow of datagrams. This paper presents and evaluates two visa protocols -one that requires distributed state information in gateways and one that uses additional encryption operations instead of distributed state. Applications for such visa protocols include access control, accounting and billing for packet transit, and network resource management.
Introduction
The local-area and long-haul networks of many distinct organizations can be joined together into an internetwork through which datagrams ow without regard to organizational boundaries. The transparency of an internetwork is both a blessing and a curse: a blessing because it provides universal connectivity without requiring application-speci c gateways, and a curse because it makes it much harder to control the ow of information between organizations.
Early internetworks ignored the issue of control, either because they connected organizations within a larger administrative unit (such as a single corporation, university, or governmental body) or because they connected research institutions with little need to limit information ow. Current internetworks connect organizations that may have competing interests. Thus, we can no longer ignore the need for controlling inter-organizational information ow. Similarly, in a multiorganization internetwork, costs must be billed to individual organizations or departments, resulting in a growing need for secure protocols to account for datagram tra c.
One approach is to introduce controls at a number of levels in the protocol hierarchy. We would like to preserve the useful properties of datagram-level transparency by controlling the ow of individual datagrams. We assume that higher-level controls will be implemented as appropriate to the particular applications and organizations involved.
To provide datagram-level control, Estrin and Tsudik have proposed the Visa scheme ?]. Conceptually, a secret key is used to compute an unforgeable mark placed on a datagram to assure a gateway that inter-organizational transmission of that datagram is properly authorized. This mark is called a visa, by analogy with the stamp made on a passport that allows the bearer to cross a border. We bind each visa to a single datagram in order to guarantee the authenticity of datagram contents. Visas were rst suggested by David Reed, and documented by J. Mracek ?] . A detailed analysis of the issues associated with inter-organizational networks, as well as the motivations behind the visa scheme, can be found in ?].
In general, a host on a visa-controlled network that wants to communicate across its organizational boundary initially engages in a high-level authorization and authentication procedure with the Access Control Servers (ACSs) on both source and destination networks (see gure ??). The need for (and particulars of) ACS authorization is determined individually by the owners of the end-point networks. When a source-destination connection has been approved by an ACS on each network, the ACSs allocate visas to the requesting host. The host uses the visas to stamp all datagrams belonging to that connection. The border gateways (\visa-gateways") of the end-point organizations check all datagrams for appropriate stamping, and pass authorized datagrams until a visa expires or is revoked. Each gateway checks the authorization of a datagram to enter or exit the attached network, not whether the datagram is authorized to travel all the way from source to destination. Visa-gateways may also use visa information to ensure that the proper parties are billed for the cost of carrying the datagrams.
In this paper we present two variations of the protocol originally proposed by Estrin and Tsudik ?]. One is an improved version of the original (\stateful") protocol, in which the ACSs distribute visas to the gateways involved. The other (\stateless") variant avoids the necessity for distributed state, but requires additional encryption steps. We then analyze the drawbacks and advantages of these two protocols based on conventional single-key (\private-key") cryptography.
(A public-key variation of the stateless protocol is discussed in ?].) 
Policies
Visas are a mechanism for authenticating the source, destination, and contents of a datagram. Authentication in itself is not an end but a means for implementing a policy, such as access control or accounting. An access control policy, applied to datagrams, requires a gateway to determine if the authenticated parties are indeed authorized to communicate. (Visa protocols described in this paper allow only authorized pairs of hosts to be authenticated.) An accounting policy requires a gateway to charge the resources used to an authenticated host; in this context a visa is a certi cate that the host has promised to pay its bills. A resource management policy requires a gateway to ensure that the authenticated host has not used up its quota of resources (for example, if datagram charges must be prepaid).
In the visa protocols we describe, gateways do not bear sole responsibility for making policy decisions. By issuing a visa, an ACS has precomputed a decision such as \these hosts are allowed to communicate," or \this host can be trusted to pay its bills." The task of a gateway is reduced to ensuring that the visa is valid and is being used correctly; the expensive part of the policy implementation is done once per connection, by the ACS, rather than once per datagram, by the gateway.
This paper emphasizes problems of access control; visa protocols described here are designed for that purpose. Accounting and resource management appear to be simpler problems; for example, one may tolerate moderate \leakage", resulting in slightly incorrect bills, if the net result is a lower overhead cost for doing the billing. Also, it is necessary to authenticate only one party (the one who is paying) if the only application is billing. Therefore, in an environment where visas are used for accounting and not for access control, somewhat di erent protocols may be appropriate; this is the subject of work in progress ?].
Network environment
We will assume that the internetwork closely follows the model of the DARPA Internet ?], which is substantially similar to the Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) model ?, ?]. The essential features of the environment are:
Hosts are autonomous and cannot necessarily be trusted. Organizational networks are connected by gateways; between any pair of hosts in di erent organizations there are at least two gateways, one belonging to each of the organizations. Conceptually, the connection between two organizations is a pair of half-gateways connected via a trusted link. Each half-gateway can be trusted by its own organization but not by any other organization. All information ows via datagrams. A datagram consists of a header that includes addressing information and a data segment that is not intelligible to gateways. A datagram may ow through several \untrusted" organizations on its way to the destination. Host addresses, both source and destination, can be forged. It is not possible (using hardware methods) to determine reliably which host actually sent a datagram or to prevent a datagram from being seen by unauthorized hosts; in other words, many Local-Area Network (LAN) technologies can be wire-tapped. Duplicate datagrams and occasional lost datagrams are natural consequences of using a datagram network. Therefore, if a malicious host duplicates datagrams from time to time, we are willing to accept the covert channel created by this method.
Design goals
The purpose of the visa protocols is to allow an organization to grant certain privileges to select, trusted hosts and to provide a means for preventing the abuse of such privileges. This is but one component in the provision of complete security. The success of a visa-based system assumes the ability to trust certain hosts not to misuse visas.
Our primary goal is to allow an organization to control the transmission of datagrams to and from hosts in other organizations. If the speci c hosts involved can be trusted then we can meet a stronger goal: we can control the transmission of datagrams to and from a speci c host in another organization. In a datagram network, as opposed to a circuit-switched network, the only information available about a datagram must be attached to the datagram rather than inferred from the route the datagram follows. Therefore, we can state these goals more directly as follows.
An organization can guarantee that: a datagram can leave the source organization O src only if O src has authorized the sender to send datagrams to the apparent destination host, and a datagram can enter the destination organization O dst only if O dst has authorized the sender to send datagrams to the apparent destination host. Visa protocols also allow each controlling organization to revoke the privileges it has granted.
Another goal is to add no cost to intra-organizational datagram tra c, nor to impose additional security measures upon hosts that do not participate in inter-organizational tra c. Similarly, we wish to limit the overhead imposed upon organizations who are not concerned with controlling external access.
Finally, we want to minimize the costs imposed by the visa protocols, including: additional per-packet processing time in both hosts and gateways, additional storage requirements for hosts and gateways, extra datagrams sent during connection setup, increments in the length of datagrams (increasing length increases latency and decreases throughput), costs of recovering from gateway crashes, and complexity of the implementations.
The security of visa protocols depends upon the secure operation of participating ACSs, gateways, and hosts, as well as upon secure distribution of visas from ACSs to gateways and hosts. Discussion of mechanisms to implement such security is beyond the scope of this paper and can be found elsewhere ?].
Structure of this paper
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the notation and the general features of the visa protocols. Section 3 describes an improved version of the original single-key visa protocol (with state information in gateways). Section 4 describes a stateless variation of the single-key protocol. Section 5 presents an evaluation and analysis of the two protocols. Experimental results are discussed in section 6. Section 7 touches upon several design issues that space does not permit us to cover in detail. Finally, section 8 summarizes our ndings. For example, H dst denotes the destination host of a datagram, and GW exit denotes a visa-gateway of the source organization through which a datagram leaves that organization's network.
Components
Both visa protocols involve the following components: visas, access control servers, gateways, and hosts. These components and their responsibilities are described in this section.
Visas
A visa is an unforgeable stamp, created by cryptographic means, that is attached to a datagram. Its presence in a datagram indicates that the datagram is allowed to leave (or enter) an organization's network. A visa can be validated by the gateways of the organization that issued the visa (or that issued the means for its generation) 3 . We describe how visa values are computed in section ??.
Each datagram carries at most two visas -one (V exit ) for entering and exiting the source organization network, and one (V entr ) for entering and exiting the destination organization network. This is necessary because the agents of one organization may not trust the agents of another organization, so source and destination visas for a datagram must be issued separately by the respective organizations 4 . 3 Estrin and Tsudik ?] originally used the term \visa" to indicate the cryptographic key used by the source and gateway to compute the unforgeable stamp. \Visa" now indicates the stamp itself, a usage closer to the English meaning of the word. 4 In this paper we assume the use of two-way visas; that is, a single visa key is used to generate visas for datagrams A visa key is allocated to an identi able source-destination pair. In this discussion we assume that the uniformly-available granularity of control and identi cation is a host; that is, visas are allocated for (H src ,H dst ) pairs.
ACSs
An ACS is a host, usually dedicated for security reasons, that is primarily concerned with access control. Each visa-controlled organization has at least one ACS, responsible for authorizing hosts within its organization to communicate with hosts in other organizations 5 . Multiple ACSs may be necessary for availability and performance reasons. Speci c policies regarding who may communicate with whom are embodied within ACSs and are not addressed directly in this paper.
Each ACS knows of a number of local visa-gateways that enforce its decisions. ACSs are trusted and assumed to defend against attempted abuse. The security of the overall protocol requires that ACSs be secure and that they employ an authenticated and secure channel for communication with local hosts and gateways.
Gateways
A gateway is a host dedicated (for reasons of performance and security) to packet forwarding. Gateways that use the visa mechanism to enforce access controls are called visa-gateways 6 . All inter-organization connections must be implemented with visa-gateways. Each visa-gateway knows the ACSs in its organization, is willing to accept visa assignments from these ACSs, and trusts their decisions about authorizing and terminating sessions. A visa-gateway allows any external party to communicate with any registered, internal ACS; similarly the gateway allows all registered, local ACSs to communicate with any external party 7 .
Assuming that each organization employs a visa-gateway, each inter-organization datagram travels through at least two such gateways. Each visa-gateway is equipped with some means of traveling into and out of an organization's network between a particular source-destination pair. However, if an organization wants to carry out separate authorization/authentication dialogs for incoming and outgoing tra c, it may do so { at the cost of double the connection setup overhead. 5 If a participant organization does not have an ACS, its hosts will still be able to communicate with the hosts of other organizations, although the organization in question will be subject to risks associated with the uncontrolled access. 6 Some gateways may not be involved in visa-enforcement (for example, gateways internal to an organization). We therefore distinguish between visa-gateways and non-visa gateways.
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Such trust is reasonable because ACSs are known to be defensive and to enforce organization policy. Other special servers such as a name server may be given a similar \carte blanche" for external communication if they too are known to be secure. verifying a visa. Visa protocols described in subsequent sections vary in the particular validation techniques used.
A visa-gateway must scrutinize every packet it receives; datagrams without visas cannot be forwarded (except for those to or from trusted entities of the gateway's own organization). In ?] we describe a mechanism for a gateway to inform a host that visas are required for an interorganizational connection. Datagrams must be dropped if they contain neither a valid visa nor a \dummy" placeholder visa indicating that a host wishes to be informed via this mechanism.
If the two organizations' networks are not directly connected, packets will pass through the gateways of transit networks. Visa-gateways in a transit network trust each other, and transfer transit packets via secure channels to prevent unauthorized entrance or exit; this is described in more detail in ?]. Non-visa gateways in transit networks treat visa datagrams as regular internet packets.
Hosts
The source host (H src ) of an inter-organization connection must obtain a pair of visas, one from the ACS of its organization (ACS src ) and one from the ACS of the destination organization (ACS dst ).
These visas must be included in the header of every datagram sent from H src to the destination host, H dst .
A host, unlike a gateway, does not have to have reliable knowledge of the local ACS's address; this may instead be supplied by a gateway when a host attempts to communicate across the organizational boundary (see ?]). The host must still use an authentication protocol to make sure it is really talking to the ACS.
Since datagram reception is a passive operation, the destination host (H dst ) is not required to initiate any actions. Of course, in almost any protocol, datagrams ow in both directions, so each host is both a source and a destination. Therefore, to avoid additional overhead we assume that an organization allows its ACS to allocate two-way visas automatically if authentication of the remote destination is not required.
By themselves, visa protocols do not provide for multi-level security, nor do they eliminate a variety of covert channels. In the absence of additional host-level, non-discretionary controls, an authorized host may still subvert these protocols by \willingly" serving as a conduit for communications between unauthorized hosts.
Establishing authorization
In the scheme originally proposed in ?], H src , when opening a connection to H dst , initially sends a datagram with an \empty" visa; if the datagram reaches a visa-gateway, the gateway replies with a REJECT message directing H src to an appropriate ACS. The source host requests a visa from that ACS, which (if necessary) obtains visas from ACSs in other organizations, distributes visa information to the appropriate gateways, and returns the valid visas to H src (and, possibly, H dst ).
The purpose of the REJECT mechanism is to accommodate hosts that do not know when a visa is required.
However, a host may already know that its intended destination is in a di erent organization, either because it has previously communicated with that host (and cached the fact that at some point it had received a REJECT), or it may have discovered this through some external mechanism (for example, a name server). If so, it may communicate immediately with an ACS of its own organization to obtain visas, rather than going through the extra two-packet step of attempting to send the initial datagram and receiving a REJECT. The REJECT mechanism is a \fallback" mechanism to inform hosts that they are crossing an organizational boundary, rather than an integral part of connection setup. Note that a REJECT may actually be sent in the middle of a connection, if a visa expires or if a gateway table over ows and active visas are purged. For further detail on the REJECT mechanism see ?].
Many inter-organizational connections are brief: in the Internet, for example, most such connections are either electronic mail transfers, which usually involve no more than a dozen datagrams, or name translations, which are even briefer. A visa authorizes datagram transmission between two hosts, not a speci c high-level connection. Therefore, we do not require hosts to obtain a fresh visa for every connection, nor do we expect hosts to inform the gateways when a visa-controlled connection terminates. \Least-recently-used" mechanisms can keep gateway caches or tables from lling with stale data. We rely upon the ACSs to enforce speci c visa expiration and revocation policies.
Computing visa values
A visa value must protect against subversion in two ways. First, it must prove that the source of a datagram is authorized to send datagrams to the destination (in other words, that an imposter cannot pose as an authorized source merely by faking its internet address). Second, it must prove that the particular data carried in a datagram is the same data that the source intended to send to the destination. We refer to this second proof as \data integrity." In general, transformation of a data value to guarantee its provenance is known as a \digital signature" ?, ?, ?].
The integrity of a visa protocol depends on the method by which the visa values are calculated. To avoid \playback attacks", a visa value must be derived from a visa key and some unique property of each individual datagram. In other words, visa = F(visakey; datagram) where F is some cryptographically strong one-way (trapdoor) function that computes a cryptographic signature of the datagram. The function chosen for F must have good cryptographic properties, yet be inexpensive to compute. In this paper, we assume that F is a function such as the DES-based
Note that the sizes of both visas and visa keys a ect the cost of computing visas; they also a ect the likelihood that a visa system can be compromised. Unfortunately, although signatures and keys with larger sizes are more resistant to attack, they also increase the cost of computing F.
3 Single-key protocol with state information in gateways This section describes the rst single-key variation of the visa protocol, derived from the one proposed in ?]. In this protocol, all non-transit visa-gateways along all possible routes of a datagram must contain an appropriate entry in their tables. Therefore, in order to set up a path between two hosts, each such gateway must communicate with its organization's ACS to obtain the visa key for the source-destination pair. This is the distinctive feature that separates this protocol from the stateless protocol discussed later in the paper. Here, each component (hosts, ACSs, and gateways) must maintain a visa-table, a database of active visa information. An entry in the visa-table pertains to the state information of a speci c inter-organization connection. In the stateless protocol, in return for slightly greater per-packet header length and encryption overhead, only the hosts must maintain reliable databases. The stateless-protocol gateways use caches to improve their performance, without requiring extra packet exchanges for database maintenance.
Creation and distribution of visa keys
In this variant, a visa key is a unique value (a cryptographic key) assigned by an ACS to a session between two hosts on distinct networks. The visa value carried in the datagram is computed as a cryptographic signature of a datagram.
Whenever an ACS issues a visa key to a host via a VISAGRANT message, it must also send the visa key to all the border visa-gateways for the organization. If there is more than one ACS for an organization, it might also be useful to distribute the visa information to other ACSs so as to improve the availability of the information in the case of host failures 8 .
Veri cation of visas
Once the visa keys are in place, H src is able to send datagrams to H dst . Every outgoing datagram addressed to H dst is stamped with both exit and entrance visas, V exit and V entr . Both values are calculated as described above. GW exit and GW entr each calculate V exit and V entr respectively (using the values V KEY exit and V KEY entr from their visa-tables), and compare them with the values found in the datagram. If the two values match, the datagram is passed, otherwise it is REJECTed. This procedure simultaneously veri es that a visa is valid, that a visa allows H src to communicate with H dst , and that the contents of a datagram are those that were sent by H src .
Connection revocation
Because many protocols do not have an explicit ending phase (for example, the delta-T protocol ?, ?]) an ACS imposes time limits on visas that it issues. The time limits are passed along with the visa keys to the local visa-gateways, which delete the connection's entry from their visa-tables as soon as the connection times out. A host that anticipates exceeding the time-limit of its current visa may request a visa extension before the visa expires, in order to avoid reapplication delays. In addition to exceeded time or resource limits, a REVOKE message may be used to revoke a visa. A REVOKE message, triggered by a request from H src , H dst , or an ACS itself, is sent to the appropriate gateways by the ACS. The system is vulnerable to the extent that REVOKE messages may be dropped or delayed.
Problems
The main drawback of this protocol is that each visa-gateway between a pair of communicating hosts must include a visa-table entry for that host-pair. This is undesirable because:
The setup mechanism used to get visas into the visa-tables generates a number of extra datagrams. At least two visas must be sent from ACSs to gateways, requiring at least that many datagrams 9 . One of the commonly-held advantages of datagram networks is their ability to e ciently and dynamically switch packets along multiple routes, thus providing some immunity to failed gateways or links, and spreading load across the available bandwidth of a well-connected network. In order to take advantage of routing redundancy when using visas, every local visa-gateway along any potential route is given the visa information at setup time, which can potentially result in (M + N) datagrams to be sent by source's and destination's ACSs to their respective visa-gateways (M and N are the number of visa-gateways in each of the organizations' networks). A gateway must maintain its visa-table, which can potentially be quite large (O(n) in the number of communicating host pairs). Table over ow is not fatal, but when a purged entry turns out to be active, part of the setup mechanism must be reinvoked. The storage overhead of visa-tables is per visa-gateway, not simply per gateway-pair, since the two gateways belong to di erent organizations and cannot trust one another. When a visa-gateway crashes, unless its visa-table is held in stable storage it must be reloaded from the organization's ACS. If the ACS crashes as well, the setup mechanism must be reinvoked for every active connection. The resulting burst in overhead tra c is likely to create congestion.
Stateless single-key protocol
In order to avoid some of the problems listed in section ??, we present a di erent visa protocol without the requirement that the gateways know about every visa. This means that we no longer have to pay the costs for setting up and storing visa-tables, although the per-packet processing costs are slightly higher, and revocation is more disruptive.
The primary di erence between the two protocols is where the gateways nd the authorization information. In the rst, or stateful protocol, a gateway keeps all authorization information about active connections in its visa-table, which must be loaded by the ACS. In the second, or stateless protocol, the authorization information is attached by cryptographic means to each datagram; a gateway needs no authorization database. In e ect, the visa information is piggybacked on each datagram rather than being directly communicated between ACSs and gateways. A digital signature system is used to maintain the integrity of this piggybacked information, and caching is used to reduce the amount of encryption overhead. A gateway can verify that a visa attached to a datagram is valid because the visa itself is signed by the issuing ACS. Signature is accomplished by encrypting the visa with a key known only to the ACSs and gateways of an organization; this is known as the \organization key". If the cryptosystem is secure, there is no chance of forgery.
It is harder to see how to protect against a malicious host that obtains a valid visa by monitoring the network and attaches this visa to its own datagrams. The trick is to have the source host sign every datagram using a secret session key known only to the source host and the visa-gateways (and to the ACSs trusted by those gateways). This key is embedded in the visa attached to the datagram, but because the visa is encrypted with the organization key, the session key is not available to interlopers. It is available to the visa-gateway as a side-e ect of verifying the authenticity of the visa. Because this key becomes known to ACS dst and GW entr , which may not be entirely trustworthy to H src , a new signature key should be generated for each path, and di erent keys should be used for exit and entrance visas. In this protocol, the function FSIG(data) returns a signature of the data (for example, a DES-based Message Authentication Code) using the secret session key, K. 11 . The safe datagram still includes the contents of the original datagram header in the unencrypted form, so it can be handled by non-visa gateways without additional mechanism. The new elds in the header are purely for the bene t of visa-gateways.
Creation of visas

Veri cation of visas
Once the safe datagram has been constructed, it is sent along whatever route has been chosen by the usual means, and eventually reaches GW exit . GW exit must verify that (1) V exit is valid, (2) V exit allows H src to send datagrams to H dst , and (3) Eventually the datagram reaches GW entr , which must verify that V entr is valid, V entr allows H src to send datagrams to H dst , and the contents of the datagram are those that were sent by H src .
These conditions are checked in the same way as they were checked for the exit visa. If they hold, the datagram can be delivered to H dst .
Avoiding the cost of visa decryption
Because V entr and V exit are constant for as long as they do not expire, a gateway can cache both encrypted and decrypted values of the visas it uses. When a datagram arrives, a gateway uses the encrypted visa found in the datagram as a key to nd a cache entry. If an entry exists, the gateway can use the contents of the decrypted visa, instead of paying the cost of visa decryption (the data signature must still be checked).
The size of the cache, unlike the size of the visa-tables used in the stateful protocol, is relatively unimportant. In the event of cache misses only one additional encryption step per datagram is required, instead of a urry of message exchanges 12 . If a gateway crashes and reboots, it need only retrieve its organization's key before continuing to process datagrams; no other messages need be exchanged.
Revocation
In some cases it might be necessary to revoke a visa. The primary mechanism for revocation is the expiration time contained in the visa's cleartext. If visas are issued with relatively short lifetimes (on the order of minutes or hours) then it is unlikely that they will need to be explicitly revoked. In the stateful protocol, visas may be revoked explicitly. In the stateless protocol, if an ACS must revoke an unexpired visa, it needs to choose a new organization key and distribute that key to all boundary gateways and ACSs of its organization. Unfortunately, this invalidates all visas issued by that organization; because of this, and because a visa might expire before a connection is nished, all visa users must be prepared to reapply for new visas at any point in a connection. 12 The size of a cache entry is twice the size as in the stateful protocol; this is because both cleartext and ciphertext versions of visas are cached.
Variations on the theme
Visas in the stateless protocol have more internal structure than those in the stateful protocol. Because that structure is visible only to the ACSs and gateways of their issuing organization, this allows some exibility in their use.
One possibility is to use di erent cryptosystems for visa generation and signature generation. Since signatures cover entire datagrams, they are best done with an inexpensive single-key system such as DES. On the other hand, visas themselves are relatively small, and given the caching scheme described in section ??, visa decryption is done infrequently. Visas could therefore be generated using a public-key system such as RSA. Use of a public-key organizational key instead of a singlekey one would reduce the danger of compromising the secret organizational key, since it would never leave the ACS.
It is also possible to include additional datagram-header elds in the visa, thereby allowing visas to be issued on, for example, a process-to-process basis rather than a host-to-host basis. Additional informational elds for use by gateways, such as a limit on the packet rate or packet count for the connection, could also be included in the visa. Any additional visa elds, however, increase the processing time in both hosts and gateways, and risk exceeding limits on datagram header size.
Evaluation and comparison of single-key protocols
In this section we evaluate and compare the two proposed protocols on the basis of their respective overhead costs. We separate the costs into per-connection costs and per-datagram costs for authorized datagrams. Per-connection costs include the extra datagrams exchanged among visa hosts, ACSs, and gateways; and the storage requirements in gateways and hosts. Per-datagram costs include encryption and decryption, additional packet length due to the visas, and table lookups in hosts and gateways.
Per-connection costs
In the stateful protocol, there are several kinds of per-connection costs:
1. Negotiations (supported by datagram exchanges) between H src and the ACSs involved: At least 2 datagrams must be sent to request the necessary visas, and at least 2 datagrams are required to return the visas to H src 13 .
2. Distribution of visas from ACSs to gateways (more datagram exchanges): Visas must be passed to at least two visa-gateways (GW exit and GW entr ); this requires at least two datagrams. In total, M + N such datagrams are sent if there are M potential exit gateways and N potential entrance gateways.
3. Table storage space and maintenance costs: Storage overhead, consisting of both space and runtime costs, is introduced in this protocol mainly by the need for all participants, but 13 In practice, any visa protocol may require additional datagrams to be generated in order for Hsrc to authenticate itself to ACSsrc and ACSdst. especially gateways, to keep visa-tables. Signi cant costs are associated with both the space required to store the table, because many connections may be active, and the cost of lookups, since one is performed for every datagram forwarded.
In the stateless protocol, some per-connection costs are reduced:
1. Distribution of visas from ACSs to gateways: This is not done at all. The only communication between ACSs and gateways is the distribution of keys at infrequent intervals.
2. Table storage space and maintenance costs: Since the only state stored in the visagateways is the cache of decrypted visas, which can be re lled at minimal cost, there is no need to maintain a complete table. Table storage space can be allocated to the extent that it is available. Average per-datagram costs will increase if the cache size is so small as to signi cantly reduce hit ratios.
The stateless protocol does require each ACS to perform an encryption operation to create a visa. It is also more expensive, in the stateless protocol, to revoke an unexpired visa because there is no way to do this without revoking all unexpired visas.
Overall, the minimum number of datagrams required to set up a connection in the stateless protocol is lower at least by two (more precisely, by M + N) since no visa distribution to gateways is done. In addition, the table storage space and maintenance costs are lower for the stateless protocol.
Per-datagram costs
The per-datagram costs for visas are the additional elds in datagrams, table look-ups, and cryptographic operations.
Each datagram must carry header elds for both exit and entrance visas. In the stateful protocol, space is required only for two rather small visas, each being a data signature. In the stateless protocol, space is required not only for two data signatures, but also for two rather large visas, each containing (in encrypted form) two source addresses, a signature key, and an expiration time.
In our implementation using 32-bit DES keys, the visas in the stateful protocol together require 8 bytes, while in the stateless protocol, the two visas and data signatures together require 40 bytes (see gure ??; note that IP requires an additional 4 bytes to indicate the presence of this option).
This di erence between the stateful and stateless protocols cannot be ignored, but is becoming less signi cant as network bandwidths increase.
Both protocols require essentially the same number of table lookups; the cache lookups done in the stateless protocol should cost about the same as the table lookups required in the stateful protocol. The only di erence is the size of the lookup key, which is twice as large in the stateless protocol.
The cryptographic operations required depend upon the data integrity scheme used. They also depend upon whether the operation involves passing over the entire datagram or over only part of the datagram. For the single-key visa protocols described in this paper, the cryptographic costs are: 4 cryptographic operations for the stateful protocol, 6 operations for the stateless protocol without cache hits, and 4 operations for the stateless protocol with cache hits (see table ??). These values include the cryptographic operations at the source host and at both intervening gateways.
Using this analysis we see that, given a reasonable cache hit rate for the stateless protocol, the per-datagram encryption costs are roughly equal for the two single-key visa protocols. The main determinant of cryptographic cost is the strength of the signature function, and thus the vulnerability of the system, rather than the particular visa protocol.
Summary
In summary, the stateless visa protocol has lower setup costs, possibly lower storage costs for the gateways (depending upon the cache size), but slightly higher per-datagram processing costs than the stateful protocol. A natural consequence of this statement is that the stateless protocol provides for more e cient handling of brief connections, since its setup cost is lower; in particular, the critical path is shorter by one packet-delay. For longer connections, once the di erence in setup costs has been amortized and the gateway caches are loaded, the stateless protocol is slightly less e cient because it requires longer packet headers. A choice between the stateless and stateful protocols may depend on other factors, such as the higher cost of selective revocation in the stateless protocol, and the higher cost of gateway table over ow in the stateful protocol. Alternatively, one could implement a hybrid protocol that would employ either the stateless or the stateful protocol depending upon the connection type.
Either protocol depends upon the availability of a high-performance cryptosystem. While public-key methods do not yet appear to meet this need (the fastest commercially available hardware, the Cylink Corporation CY1024, is speci ed to encrypt up to 2 Kbits/second ?]), single-key systems such as DES are already capable of matching high-speed LAN bandwidths (the AMD AMZ8068 is speci ed to encrypt up to 1.7 Mbytes/second ?]).
Experimental results
The purpose of our experiments was to evaluate per-datagram, connection setup, and overall network costs of visa protocols. This section presents a brief description of our implementation, and analyzes performance measurements of a prototype implementation of both stateful and stateless protocols.
We conducted two sets of experiments, the rst on a logical internet in our laboratory at USC, and the second across the DARPA Internet. The laboratory data provide a basis for comparing the relative overheads of the various visa protocols presented. The Internet data prove the feasibility of implementing visa protocols in an operational internet environment, and illustrate the relatively low overhead of visas in a context of relatively high transmission delay.
Visa implementation
For both laboratory and Internet experiments, visa protocols were implemented as modi cations to the IP code in 4.3BSD UNIX running on IBM PC RTs 14 . Visa-gateways, hosts, and ACSs all used RTs with 4 megabytes of internal memory. The RTs were connected to an Ethernet with standard Ungerman-Bass Ethernet adaptors. DES encryption, in Electronic Code-Book (ECB) mode, was done in hardware using prototype cards from the Information Technology Center of Carnegie-Mellon University (CMU-ITC). Although the AMD AMZ8068 chip used on the card is speci ed to encrypt up to 1.7 Mbytes/second ?], the prototype board itself encrypts large data blocks at only 200 Kbytes/second due to slow I/O. The IP option de nitions for both visa protocols are depicted in gure ??.
We encountered a signi cant problem with our rst implementation of the stateless protocol { we exceeded the maximum IP header size of 60 bytes! In order to implement the stateless protocol within existing IP, we cut down the size of DES keys and data signatures from 64 to 32 bits. Although clever encoding techniques could be used used to pack additional key bits into the header, the stateless protocol is unlikely to coexist with any other IP options, due to the header length limit.
Experimental con gurations
For the laboratory experiments, we created logically separate networks on top of a single physical network by manipulating the routing databases for local hosts (see gure ??).
Our Internet con guration consisted of networks in two universities, USC and UCLA, each connected to the ARPAnet. The visa networks sit within campus networks which each connect to the ARPAnet (see gure ??). 
Laboratory measurements
In the laboratory experiment we measured the round-trip datagram times for both visa and non-visa implementations under conditions of similar network load. We measured six protocol variations: no visas, the stateful and stateless visa protocols without encryption (to measure the overhead due to the additional header length of visa packets), the stateful protocol, and the stateless protocol with and without cache hits.
After the initial connection setup, datagram round-trip time was measured using the ICMP Echo protocol ?]. In this protocol, a request datagram travels from H src to the H dst , which immediately returns a reply datagram. We used ICMP Echo instead of an application protocol (such as le transfer or remote login) to isolate, as much as possible, the overhead associated with the visa protocols. Table ? ? shows measured round-trip datagram times for datagrams of varying data length. The results are also presented in graphical form in gure ??. The slight performance advantage of the stateful protocol comes from the shorter header used, compared with the stateless protocol.
A signi cant portion of the visa protocol overhead is due to encryption. Table ? ? summarizes the per-datagram cryptographic costs for the three variations described in sections ?? and ??.
Note that the encryption overhead for the stateless protocol with cache hits is the same as that for the stateful protocol. The table gives one-way overhead; for the round-trip measurements we made, twice as many encryptions are performed.
Actual measurements of the total encryption costs are shown in table ??.
These measurements correspond closely to calculations based upon the number of encryption operations. For example, a round-trip for a 1 Kbyte datagram requires 8 encryptions; at an encryption rate of 200 Kbytes/second, encrypting 8K bytes should take 40 ms. The measured value is 53 ms. The discrepancy comes from per-datagram overhead in using the encryption hardware, which is not re ected in the nominal 200 Kbyte/second rate (measured for encryptions of much larger data blocks).
Since it should be possible to employ the AMZ8068 DES chip to encrypt data at up to 1.7 X X GW entr checks DSIG entr X X TOTAL NUMBER 4 6 4 The connection setup time for the stateful visa protocol ranged from 30 to 40 ms, averaging about 33 ms. This number represents the time from when the rst unstamped datagram is sent to the time that the visa arrives at H src , allowing stamped datagrams to be sent. The REJECT mechanism is employed, but the ACS to GW communication is not secured by encryption or other privacy mechanisms.
Internet measurements
The laboratory Ethernet has higher bandwidth, and is more lightly loaded, than the typical interorganizational network. Therefore, we also conducted experiments over the DARPA Internet to demonstrate the visa protocols in a more realistic context. The path between USC and UCLA includes a highly-congested, low-bandwidth (56 Kbit/sec) hop, as well as several non-visa gateways.
In this con guration, not only is the average delay much higher, but the variance in queueing delay is larger than the di erence between the visa and non-visa protocol overheads. Consequently, we must emphasize that the results cannot be used to compare the various visa protocols to one another, but are presented primarily to demonstrate the reduced signi cance of visa overhead in the context of other sources of network delay.
In order to obtain the most meaningful average values for visa and non-visa protocols, we ran suites of measurements at di erent times of the day and week in search of a period of relatively low delay variance. The numbers presented in table ?? (and graphically in gure ??) are from a suite run during a three hour interval when delay varied least. In addition, we excluded the highest delay values when calculating the averages for each protocol.
These measurements may understate the cost of visa protocols, since the encryption operations involved were probably being performed in parallel with the transmission of other packets over a congested link. In an uncongested network, through gateways that handle only visa-controlled datagrams, this parallelism might not be available, and the additional end-to-end delay imposed by the visa protocols could be as large as it is in our laboratory experiments. Our results demonstrate the function of the stateful and stateless protocols in both laboratory and actual inter-organizational internet arrangements. They show that, while the overhead for our implementation is signi cant, it is not prohibitive.
The laboratory results provide a basis for comparing the protocols to one another. They con rm our prediction that the stateless protocol performs nearly as well as the stateful one, on perdatagram delay, only when the cache-hit rate is reasonably high. (In the operating region where the number of active conversations is greater than the size of a gateway's visa-table, the stateless protocol may perform better than the stateful protocol.) These results also show that comparing the cost of connection setup in the stateful protocol to the cost of setting up cache entries in the stateless protocol, for connections involving only a few datagrams, the stateless protocol may have a small edge. In the steady state, the di erence in delay of approximately 2 msec per datagram is due to the additional length of stateless-protocol visa options.
The Internet results demonstrate that when visa mechanisms are added to subsets of existing Internet gateways and hosts both variations of the protocol work without interfering with nonvisa, local network or internet, operations. These results also demonstrate that the overhead of visa protocols is much less signi cant in high-delay environments. The results from the laboratory experiments provide an upper bound on the overhead of visa protocols; the relative overhead in actual inter-organizational networks will be lower, since over such paths the delays due to visa protocols stay xed, while delays due to transmission and gateway processing generally are higher.
The critical prerequisite for practical application of visa protocols is faster encryption hardware. If encryption rates are not improved by an order of magnitude over that of the equipment we used, visa-related encryption processing will present an overwhelming burden to high-speed gateways that can otherwise process several thousand packets per second. We believe that acceptable encryption rates are feasible with current technology.
Other design issues
Several other design issues are listed below and are discussed in more detail in ?].
Access Control and Denial of Service:
Overall security of an organization's network depends upon ACS to host and GW commu-nication security. There is also the possibility of denial of service through harassment of ACSs with REQUEST messages. In addition, visa protocols do not prevent all replay of valid messages (if done while a visa key is valid).
Reducing the cost of connection setup
The actual cost of connection setup depends upon how an organization chooses to con gure its ACS. For example, we assume that two-way visas are allocated automatically. If one way visas are used the cost of connection setup will be doubled.
Protecting transit organizations
Transit organizations are vulnerable if internal hosts accept datagrams not addressed to them. A transit organization may be protected through the use of encryption-based encapsulation as the datagram traverses the transit net.
Visas and fragmentation
The visa protocols described make use of data signatures. Fragmentation results in a change in (that is, truncation of) the data contents of a packet. However, fragmentation can be accommodated if necessary (see ?, ?]). Covert channels via header elds A data signature method must cover not only the data segment, but any datagram header elds whose authenticity cannot be checked by the gateways. Any unchecked eld leaves a potential covert channel, since a malicious host could copy a valid datagram, change the unchecked eld, and send the modi ed copy without raising suspicion. It is easy to reduce the bandwidth of this channel to only a few bits per packet; it is nearly impossible to reduce it further.
Implications for Internet gateway design
Combining the functions of a conventional Internet gateway with that of a visa-gateway represents a challenge to gateway designers. The increased number of possible error conditions and cost of encryption processing overhead makes achievement of high throughput more di cult.
Conclusions
We have described two variations on the original visa scheme ?] for controlling datagram ow between organizations. The rst involves direct transfer of authentication information between ACSs and gateways, state maintenance in the gateways, and a cryptographic mechanism to mark authorized datagrams. In the second variation, authentication information is \piggybacked" on the controlled datagrams, rather than directly communicated between ACSs and gateways, and the gateways maintain caches rather than true databases. The two protocols vary in the number of packets required to authorize a connection, their behavior under load and during failure recovery, and the amount of encryption performed on each datagram; experimental results illustrate these tradeo s.
Adaptation of visas in actual internetworks depends on several prerequisites: resolution of a few design choices and parameters, the widespread availability of inexpensive, fast, and secure cryptosystems, and su cient coordination among organizations to make the system worthwhile.
Visas are at best a robust mechanism for enforcing information ow control policies; the choice and speci cation of these policies will present di cult and interesting problems.
